'Like with everything in every war that has ever been prosecuted since ww1 a question of resources';

'>>61462991
the RAF had better fighter production, the home field advantage, a much more competent leadership, and a better program for their pilots that made it so aces became instructors instead of being sent on more missions to die allowing them to pass on their skills to future pilots, and they had overall better tech to work with';

'>>61462991
read the memoirs of galland who fought the battle of britain as a staffel leader (if i remember correctly) and later was head of the fighters of the luftwaffe.

like their kind it was something like "we were absolutely aryan pure blooded warriors but superiors gave retarded orders that made us loose"
reality is they had numerical advantage at the start but they fought on enemy territory so atrittion was unsustainable, the alternative that galland proposes is to dont even fight the battle of britain and save everything for later to fight a defensive battle or against the soviets.

imo it was all really good technology so tactics were developed during the war';

'Pre 1943 the Luftwaffe, RAF and VVS couldn't do long range strikes with escorted bombers. In Europe-Africa small single engine fighters were far superior to heavy fighters, bombers without escorts, etc but with a mediocre range that made them unsuitable for long range strikes. The RAF had advantage in England and the Luftwaffe had advantage in continental Europe. That didn't change up to the very long range late war allied fighters.
A Zero with better high altitude performance could have been really problematic in Europe pre-1943, but that's fanfic.';

'>>61463084
*really new technology';

'fighters could only stay over england for like 20-30 minutes';

'>>61462991
The Luftwaffe got whittled down in the first few months of the war (especially in experienced pilots, which affected training capabilities) and resource shortages meant they never were able to both recover and contest the Allies in the air.';

'The Luftwaffe kept on trying to break Britain, incurring attritional losses associated with offense. Also they underestimated the value Chain Home was providing and didn't focus bombing campaigns on it for a long time.';

'>Cntrl - F "radar"
>0 results';

'>>61463173
see >>61463159
>Cntrl - F "Chain Home"
>0 results';

'>>61463004
>>61463034
>>61463084
>>61463103
>>61463119
>>61463121
>>61463159
thanks for the insights :)';

'>>61462991
The luftwaffe kicked the RAF's ass over France but got pushed too hard by Göring in a new campaign against Britain where the missions parameters kept shifting.
With the short ranges of the planes at the time the luftwaffe was at a severe disadvantage fighting over the canal.
Overall the Battle of britain could be seen as a draw but the RAF while teetering on the brink of collapse at the beginning of the conflict came out with more pilots, planes and plane production while the Germans lost valuable hard to replace planes, manpower and expertise on a campaign that ultimately produced nothing but a strengthening of the enemy's rsolve, on a crucial moment in the build up to the great clash in the East.';

'Also, fighting over British soil exclusively, or at least close and off the coast, meant that every RAF pilot who survived a shoot down could be put into a new plane the next day to go do it again, while every German became a POW and was out of the fight.';

'>>61463034
In a nutshell

>>61463084
>memoirs
>reality is they had numerical advantage at the start but they fought on enemy territory so atrittion was unsustainable
This is why memoirs are unreliable; it's unlikely that Galland himself was aware at the time he wrote that of the many ways the RAF was stacking the deck against him, he fixated on his personal bugaboos and what sounded good for the post-WW2 audience and that was it

>>61463220
>The luftwaffe kicked the RAF's ass over France
Not hard to do that when the RAF was fighting in France from shitty French grass fields using just half its obsolescent fighter force against the more experienced Luftwaffe equipped with more numbers of modern fighters (Bf109) flying from home fields
>the Battle of britain could be seen as a draw
It was a definite RAF victory both tactically and strategically, a highly successful defence that killed many experienced Luftwaffe pilots and depleted the fighter inventory while the RAF grew stronger instead in both pilot experience and fighter technology (replacing Hurricanes with Spitfires)';

'>>61463410
NTA, but the RAF had various issues in france aside form being awa from home. the standard flying formation was a very tight V, which looked great in an airshow, but was had to manuever and demanded too much of the pilots attention to maintain. there was also the issue of how aircraft were organised on the ground, often in straight lines with limited camo, making it easy for ground attack aircraft. the germans had learned these lessons in spain etc so the RAF had to play catch up.';

'>>61463034
>aces became instructors instead of being sent on more missions to die allowing them to pass on their skills to future pilots
That's fake';

'>>61463034
>better tech
Anon...the nazis literally time travelled to the future to win the war';

'>>61465723
WTF BEST MANDELA EFFECT EVER!!!';

'The Germans didn’t have drop tanks on the 109 until the end of 1940 so it was simply too late. 110s were not suitable. The home-turf advantage for the British was simply too great. Even of the 109 entered the Battle of Britain with drop tanks it probably wouldn’t have been enough to overcome the British advantage. Frankly it was a strategic error from the beginning, the air campaign against the Brits was a mistake.';

'>>61462991
If the Germans had not bothered trying to eliminate the RAF, and instead dedicated all those Luftwaffe men and machines lost in the Battle of Britain to Operation Barbarossa, would it have had any significant effect on the outcome of the war against the Soviets?';

'>>61462991
Sortie rate';

'>>61463173
>>61463186
Wizarding war';

'>>61466709
Yes, duh.
Same goes for all the axis forces having to occupy half of europe or having to bail the italians out in greece/libia/sicily. Barbarossa was a pretty close thing in its first year despite all the historical determinism by armchair generals after the fact. ("OFC Germany couldn't win dude, cause they lost IRL, I am very smart") If it hadnt been for britain constanly draining axis resources from the eastern front the war could have gone very differently.';

'>>61463220
What a retard';

'>>61462991
hitler was retard bombed london instead of airfield';

'>>61466709
No, because Americans and British would have doubled down in their effort to bail out their communist buddies';

'>>61462991
They kicked their asses, despite that part of the war just being a distraction. In the end, it was a war of attrition, though.';

'>>61462991
Read up on the Dowding system, paved the way for modern interception networks.';

'>>61466976
>Wizarding war
>Cntrl - F "Operation Cone of Power
>0 results
More a witchcraft war than wizarding war';

'>>61463084
Memoirs are not valid sources of information, they're on the same level as rumor.';

'>>61463084
the german "we lost because of bad orders we are super-men in reality it was the bad orders" cope has to be the biggest cringe about WW2.

Allies simply had better pilots and better planes, thats it, thats all there is to it.';

'>>61462991
No strategical planning. The Luftwaffe was built as a tool for CAS and CAP to cover the ground troops and nothing more. Also,German staff autism and blind faith in the Führer and Goering (at least at the beginning of the war).';

'>>61466709
Without a proper stratefical bombing campaign targeting the railroads and train convoys, these additionnal planes wouldn't have made any difference at all, so no.';

'>>61463004
I didn't know the Iraq War was decided by resources and mass production.';

'Was always a near impossible task for the Luftwaffe. Don't believe the myth, the brits love to twist a story into them being the heroic underdog. At no point in the battle was the RAF ever in threat of collapse, in fact they grew in both planes and pilots every week of the 3 month battle and finished it larger and better operating than they began. Only 1 day of those 3 months did the Luftwaffe shoot down more planes than the RAF, and their pilots could not be recovered.';

'>>61470927
and germany for some reason never attacked radar stations until the end of the battle of britain';

'>>61478465
They couldn't attack "radar stations" as control rooms were underground and mostly immune and the actual radar antenna were too difficult to hit - these where thin tall pylons not modern dish/face. They tried attacking these plyons at the start of the battle but was a waste of time and lots of Stukas lost.';

'>>61463084
>the alternative that galland proposes is to dont even fight the battle of britain and save everything for later to fight a defensive battle or against the soviets.

Has anyone crunched these numbers? What have the spreadsheet enjoyers determined to have been the optimum german resource allocation wrt the Luftwaffen?';

'>>61478515
i was referring to the arrays themselves, which probably should have been an objective if they didn't want all their attacks known in advance, even if they were difficult to hit';

'>>61463220
lmao get fucked naziboo';

'>>61478608
That's what I said. They were a primary target at the start of the battle (after the warm up of attacks on shipping in the channel) but the results were so negative (couldn't be knocked out - and even if out can be repaired in hours) and the loses so high that it was the cause of the Stuka being withdrawn from frontline service in the battle.';

'>>61462991
A with everything it was a combination of many, many factors. Here's a non-exhaustive list:
>Both the Germans and the RAF got the strength of their opponent wrong. The RAF overestimated the Luftwaffe's peak strength, who in turn underestimated the peak strength of Fighter Command. Both sides worked towards their false conclusions. Germany expected a quick victory. The Brits knuckled in for a grim and protracted battle to the death. Guess how that worked out.
>The Brits were flat out better at making use of what were at the time emerging technologies, but also in countering the German attempts at using the same technologies. Chaff and radar jamming, the Battle of the Beams, integrated early warning, etc etc. They were exceptionally good at basically trolling the German iterative design process, at some points even guessing from overly descriptive codenames what exactly the Luftwaffe's next toy would be.
>Along with the above, their iterative improvements to their aircraft and air defense systems were better. Knowing ahead of time what your enemy was working on helped a lot.
>As others have said, home-field advantage played a significant role.
>Britain completely owned the intel game, and owned it for most of the war.
>The RAF had the advantage of having a leadership that didn't actively lie to cover up their own fuckups, and keep throwing men into the grinder of a losing battle';

'>>61478769
>The RAF had the advantage of having a leadership

What is often overlooked is the tactics Dowding employed during the battle. He knew the RAF would win a battle of attrition, because his pilots could be recovered, so his orders were that there would be no large scale engagements were losses would be too big at one time.

Consequently, every interception by the RAF was something like 12-20 RAF fighters vs 150 enemy bombers and 100 fighters. The brits would climb then zoom only making 1 or 2 passes at bombers then break off for home, making them hard to engage, actual long dogfights were rare and mostly took place when big wings formed at the very end of the battle when the Luftwaffe went against London during daylight.

That is how they won, but it caused huge critcism of Dowding as a lot of bombers got through due to these small interceptions and caused civilian casualites (Dowding accepted this as it didn't affect the actual battle). That was the main reason he was dismissed soon after the Battle of Britain even though he won it. (The other main reason being not developing a night fighter force sooner).';

'>>61478769
>at some points even guessing from overly descriptive codenames what exactly the Luftwaffe's next toy would be.
IF you'Re referring to the 'odin' beam setup, that was actually pure chane , the initial German design used two beams, they changed the approach to the problem but kept the system's code name.

Also, you could mention the fact that most Luftwaffe higher ups wer political postings with litttle or no technical or operational knowledge and skills.
But they were making technical, operational and even tactical decisions.
Also, also the 3rd Reich ran an aeronautical research setup that is a textbook example for how you should never, ever run your research and production programmes.';

'>>61478843
Compare this to the Luftwaffe tactics. They had no idea how to win the battle. When they used the BF109 to go on hunting missions they left bombers too vulnerable and the RAF radar/control stations would direct their fighters away from these 109 groups. When they ordered the 109's to be close escort to the bombers, the brits would not engage in dogfights with them and just strafe and run.

They didn't know what to do with the bombers either. Trying to hit industrial targets was ineffective with early 1940's bad bombing accuracy meaning hardly anything important was hit.

Using their bombers against airfields was also mostly useless. Some films like the Battle of Britain, and historians writing soon after the war said that the airfield bombing was dangerous and almost broke the RAF, but later analysis showed this was not true at all. No airfield was out of operation for more than 2 days, and the brits had smaller 'satellite' airfields near their main ones that were used if the main airfield was hit. Also they had plenty of other airfields in middle England used by backup/reserve groups (many pilots perfered operating from these as it gave them more time to climb when attacking enemy formations).';

'>>61463220
>Overall the Battle of britain could be seen as a draw
Get fucked Hans. Superior pilots, planes and radar blew you fuckers out of the sky.';

'>>61474456
and home advantage, lots of sensors of all kinds (from shepherd on top of a hill to acoustic locators to Chain Home) and the just-invented concept of IADS (kudos Air Marshall Dowding)';

'>>61476506
Well now you do.';

'>>61462991
pilot attrition. brit pilots when shot down can parachute safely and get a new plane keeping their experience. german pilots get shot down over britain and become pows. plus all the better pilots got sent to the eastern front and like many have said, never got relegated to instructor roles and did not pass down their skills';

'When you spank the enemy so hard 1/3 of their aircrews get a form of PTSD called 'channel sickness' wherein everytime they see the English channel they have a full blown panic attack.';

'>>61464609
History Channel stuff.
The vic was the standard fighter formation for most countries before the Spanish Civil War. Since all nations used it, for bombers and fighters alike, it was combat-intuitive to follow suit. The vic arose naturally for the same reason geese adopt it; the leader leads, everyone follows, it's not really difficult to travel long distances in, but it IS difficult to manoeuvre in. Also, the RAF found that concentrating the fire of three aircraft on any one bomber was pretty much guaranteed to break it up fast.

The Luftwaffe's paired fighting tactic was basically just more efficient, as two fighters could do the job of three. But this was a problem that persisted through the Battle of Britain.

> there was also the issue of how aircraft were organised on the ground, often in straight lines with limited camo
The RAF didn't have that problem, the French Air Force did. And later on, the Soviets.

>>61465148
You're fake

>>61465857
>110s were not suitable
Thankfully, the Luftwaffe never realised the 110 was an excellent fast bomber the same way the Mosquito was, later on.

>>61478608
They tried, but the targets were not obvious and photoreconnaissance was not useful. Radar towers were difficult to knock out with the technology of the time, bunkers were virtually invisible, and even power stations were hidden amongst civilian infrastructure.

>>61479901
>all the better pilots got sent to the eastern front
The 1940 Luftwaffe was broken way before Germany declared war on the Soviets.';

'>>61479939

Imagine all the diarrhoea in the cockpt';

'>>61479939
>>61479976
Fear and prolonged stress fucks you up physically
it's all hormones';

'>>61479999

Checked.

I know anon, I broke up with a BPD gf and got diverticulitis and gallbladder polyps';

'>>61463004
I hate logisticsniggers so much.

Reductionist dogshit.';

'>>61480992
logistics wins wars, people don't meme this for a laugh its because its true. cope and sneed';